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Abstract 
Legal scholars have in the last several years embarked 
upon an ongoing discussion and debate over a 
potential Legal Singularity that might someday occur, 
involving a variant or law-domain offshoot leveraged 
from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) realm amid its 
many decades of deliberations about an overarching 
and generalized technological singularity (referred to 
classically as The Singularity). This paper examines 
the postulated Legal Singularity and proffers that such 
AI and Law cogitations can be enriched by these three 
facets addressed herein: (1) dovetail additionally 
salient considerations of The Singularity into the Legal 
Singularity, (2) make use of an in-depth and 
innovative multidimensional parametric analysis of the 
Legal Singularity as posited in this paper, and (3) align 
and unify the Legal Singularity with the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) associated with AI Legal Reasoning 
(AILR) as propounded in this paper. 
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1 Background of The Singularity 
In section 1 of the paper, the topic of The Singularity 
is introduced and addressed. Doing so establishes the 
groundwork for section 2, covering a form of 
singularity that has come to be known as the Legal 
Singularity (LS), considered to be an offshoot or a 
domain-specific variant of the overarching The 
Singularity. Section 3 indicates the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), 
which will be instrumental in the discussions 
undertaken in Section 4. Section 4 then provides an in-
depth analysis of the Legal Singularity as it relates to 
the LoA of AI Legal Reasoning and lays out an 
important parametric analysis of the Legal Singularity. 
The final section, Section 5, covers additional 
considerations and future research. 
 
This paper then consists of these five sections: 
• Section 1: Background of The Singularity 
• Section 2: Legal Singularity  
• Section 3: Autonomous Levels of AI Legal   
                 Reasoning 
• Section 4: Legal Singularity Multidimensionality,  
                 Alignment with LoA AILR 
• Section 5: Additional Considerations and Future 
                  Research 
 
Since the word “singularity” is used in at least two 
contexts within this paper, one context being an 
overarching or grandiose kind of singularity, typically 
referred to as The Singularity, and the other being a 
singularity specific to the field of law, known as the 
Legal Singularity, the convention in this paper will be 
that whenever referring to the Legal Singularity this 
will be done by stating “Legal Singularity” or by the 
abbreviation of “LS,” while the larger The Singularity 
will be referred to as the “singularity” or “AI 
singularity” or “Technological singularity,” and when 
desiring to especially emphasize such a reference it 
will be stated as The Singularity (such an emphasize is 
done solely for drawing attention to the matter and not 
due to suggesting any differences of meaning or 
connotation). 
 
1.1 Understanding The Singularity 
 
A longstanding discussion and debate in the field of 
Artificial Intelligence entails a controversy referred to 
as The Singularity [9] [14] [28] [39]. Sometimes also 
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coined as the AI Singularity or the Technological 
Singularity, the concept underlying the matter is 
relatively ill-defined and has substantively varied in 
details of its meaning and substance over the now 
many years of its postulation (dating back to the 
1950s). 
 
Often first-traced to commentary by the famous 
mathematician and pioneering computer scientist John 
von Neumann, here is what researcher Ulman [58] in 
1958 indicated had occurred in a conversation with 
Von Neumann: “One conversation centered on the 
ever-accelerating progress of technology and changes 
in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance 
of approaching some essential singularity in the 
history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we 
know them, could not continue.” 
 
Essentially, the sentiment at the time was that 
computers might eventually be able to achieve human 
intelligence, potentially even eclipsing human 
intelligence, and the result could be problematic for 
humanity. Of course, similar exhortations have been 
replete in science fiction, though typically proffered by 
imaginative writers with unsupported visions rather 
than by bona fide scientists that are making such 
speculations based on their assessment of the 
underlying technology and attempting to anticipate 
future outcomes. That’s not to suggest that those 
scientists will necessarily be on par with predicting the 
future, and there are many documented instances of 
scientists that were wildly off-the-target and baseless 
in their prophesizing. In short, expertise in a subject 
matter is a worthwhile basis for providing meaningful 
predictions, nonetheless, that expertise can still be 
misguided or mistaken as to what the future might 
hold. 
 
In 1965, Oxford researcher Irving John Good [36] 
published a cornerstone research paper that extended 
the singularity notion and tied the topic to the 
emergence of computers that might be considered as 
ultra-intelligent, commonly today referred to as aiming 
to be super-intelligent or super-human in capability. 
Rather than emphasizing the dangers associated with 
mankind developing an ultra-intelligent machine, 
Good [36] urged that the survival of humanity 
depended on being able to craft such a system and 
indeed ought to be done as soon as possible: “The 
survival of man depends on the early construction of 
an ultra-intelligent machine.” 
 
Here is Good’s [36] definition associated with the 
capabilities envisaged: “Let an ultra-intelligent 
machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass 
all the intellectual activities of any man however 
clever. Since the design of machines is one of these 
intellectual activities, an ultra-intelligent machine 
could design even better machines; there would then 
unquestionably be an intelligence explosion, and the 
intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus, the 
first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that 
man need ever make.” 
 
In this initial elucidation of the topic by Good, a key 
facet that has become inextricably woven into the 
singularity rubric is the speculative idea of an 
intelligence explosion. In short, if mankind can craft 
an AI system to some threshold of intelligence, it is 
presumed that the AI could then further progress, 
essentially on its own accord, by using its core base of 
intelligence to further produce more intelligence. No 
one as yet knows what this minimum threshold might 
be, and nor is there any viable means to anticipate how 
far the presumed intelligence explosion might proceed 
in terms of the upper limits of some unknown super-
intelligence, raising the perennial question of how high 
is up, as it were. 
 
Pursuing for the moment the somewhat tangential but 
relevant question concerning the notion of an 
intelligence explosion, let’s consider the ramifications 
of such a phenomenon, if indeed possible (no one 
knows whether it is or not). Similar to questions that 
arose during the creation of the atom bomb, whereby 
scientists were somberly worried that the ignition and 
exploding of an atomic bomb might somehow catch 
hold and violently and rapidly spread across the globe 
in an unheralded conflagration, some assert that the 
same might happen in the case of an intelligence 
explosion. To wit, the intelligence being produced 
might magnify and expand, for which the result could 
be to have humans seem like mere ants in intelligence 
versus the super-intelligence spawned by AI. Again, 
some view this outcome as disastrous for humanity, 
possibly being enslaved by a super-intelligent AI, 
while others believe that mankind might be saved due 
to an artificial super-intelligence that could solve the 
gravest problems confronting the survivability of 
humans. 
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In his research, Good attempted to outline some of the 
overall features or elements that seemed at the time to 
potentially be required to achieve an AI super-
intelligence. For example, he debated those theories of 
the period concerning a tremendous amount of 
parallelism that would be needed, a facet of modern-
day computers that were not especially viable when 
Good [36] wrote his paper in the 1960s: “It cannot be 
regarded as entirely certain that an ultra-intelligent 
machine would need to be ultraparallel since the 
number of binary operations per second performed by 
the brain might be far greater than is necessary for a 
computer made of reliable components. Neurons are 
not fully reliable; for example, they do not all last a 
lifetime; yet the brain is extremely efficient. This 
efficiency must depend partly on ‘redundancy’ in the 
sense in which the term is used in information theory. 
A machine made of reliable components would have 
an advantage, and it seems just possible that 
ultraparallel working will not be essential. But there is 
a great waste in having only a small proportion of the 
components of a machine active at any one time.” 
 
At this time, there is still no definitive means to 
specify what the AI might be composed of that would 
lead to the singularity, and the work on these facets 
remains exploratory and speculative in nature. 
Furthermore, not everyone conceives of the singularity 
as necessarily requiring super-intelligence, and nor an 
intelligence explosion. Some proffer that the 
singularity might be considered as the reaching of 
human intelligence via AI, often referred to as 
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). At that 
achievement alone, the singularity will have been 
achieved, some contend. Whether this then leads to a 
subsequent intelligence explosion, and some kind of 
super-intelligence, can be considered a separate aspect, 
for which the singularity then perhaps is essentially a 
furtherance or extension rather than an initial arrival 
per se. 
 
Consider these variations: 
a) Singularity is the achievement of AI such that 
the AI has attained human intelligence 
capabilities 
b) Singularity is the eclipsing of human 
intelligence by AI and attaining a super-
intelligence 
c) Singularity is an intelligence explosion whereby 
AI generates or spawns further intelligence. 
 
Arguments ensue as to which of those is the 
“singularity” and also whether they must be combined 
or co-existent to count as the singularity occurring. 
Perhaps “a” or arrival at human intelligence is 
mandatory for getting to “b,” though others contend 
that it is possible that an AI decidedly less-than-human 
intelligence levels might percolate via “c” per an 
intelligence explosion and then nearly instantaneously 
exceed “a” and arrive at “b,” thus never especially 
settling down at the mere capacity of human 
intelligence. Others argue that there is not anything 
feasibly beyond human intellectual capacities, 
regardless of how adept the AI might be, and as such 
the achievement of human intelligence is the capstone 
limit. In that case, the singularity would be solely 
about the “a” and not take into account the “b” and “c” 
postulates which are deemed as impossible and a false 
aspiration. 
 
Additionally, some assert that a super-intelligence 
might be reached without any need for and indeed no 
occurrence at all of an intelligence explosion. In this 
claim, an intelligence explosion is unlikely, perhaps 
even impossible per se, and that the super-intelligence 
might arise is some other more “mundane” manner 
and not due to a speculative and seeming spectacular 
intelligence explosion. Variations of that theory are 
that an intelligence explosion might very well occur, 
but it will be more of a whimper than a bang, such that 
the explosion is not particularly explosive. Instead, 
envision that intelligence oozes or synergizes with 
other intelligence, doing so demurely, rather than in a 
highly combustive manner. 
 
The variants consist of these possibilities (but not 
limited to) that might constitute The Singularity: 
• “a” only 
• “b” only 
• “c” only 
• “a” and “b” mandatory 
• “b” and “c” mandatory 
• “a” and “c” mandatory 
• “a” and “b” and “c” mandatory 
• Other 
 
For purposes of this discussion, we relax the potential 
requirement that the singularity must have a super-
intelligence and also that an intelligence explosion is 
required. Since the singularity is already a highly 
conceptualized theory, to begin with, it seems 
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reasonable to accept the notion that if human 
intelligence is achieved via AI, this accomplishment 
by itself would present the same potentiality as would 
the super-intelligence and the intelligence explosion. 
In essence, wherein some believe that only a super-
intelligence bodes for the outcomes of either goodness 
or badness for society, there is ample room to equally 
speculate that an AI of human intelligence capability 
could likewise give rise to magnitudes of goodness 
and badness for society. Keep in mind that such an AI 
would presumably be able to be replicated and shared 
all across the globe, giving a boost to its potential 
impacts, regardless that it might not be deemed as 
super-intelligent or was not borne from an intelligence 
explosion. 
 
It is further conceivable that we might split the 
difference and find a middle ground of a singularity at 
phase one, consisting of reaching human intelligence, 
and then a phase two of singularity that involves 
super-intelligence. Some are not satisfied with this 
two-phased division and insist that the singularity can 
only occur if super-intelligence is achieved. This is 
somewhat a disingenuous contention though if there is 
no means to codify or specify what the super-
intelligence consists of. Indeed, one of the ongoing 
disputes about the very notion of super-intelligence is 
that there is a paucity of substantive criteria to pin 
down the capacities that super-intelligence presumably 
guarantees, raising the question of how will we know 
that super-intelligence has been attained and that it is 
not an AI-based human level of intelligence that just 
so happens to seem super-intelligent from our 
perspective. Those that proffer the archetypal “I’ll 
know it when I see it” retort are not especially 
contributory to these serious-minded deliberations. 
 
The renowned book about AI Singularity by Ray 
Kurzweil [39] in 2006 has become a foundational 
treatise on the topic of The Singularity and wrestles 
comparably with many of the potential facets of what 
the singularity constitutes. Kurzweil directly tackles 
the numerous criticisms about the singularity, 
including instances of doubt expressed by the assumed 
limits on neural processing, the Church-Turing thesis, 
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, theism, holism, and 
the like. After examining those numerous and varied 
critiques, Kurzweil [39] steadfastly asserts: “The 
Singularity, as we have discussed it in this book, does 
not achieve infinite levels of computation, memory, or 
any other measurable attribute. But it certainly 
achieves vast levels of all of these qualities, including 
intelligence. With the reverse engineering of the 
human brain, we will be able to apply the parallel, 
self-organizing, chaotic algorithms of human 
intelligence to enormously powerful computational 
substrates.” 
 
In that sense, it does not seem well-intentioned to 
debate in any preoccupied manner on the merits of AI 
Singularity as to whether a super-intelligence is 
attained, and nor whether there is an intelligence 
explosion, and instead concentrate on the 
overwhelming and overarching factor of AI 
embodiment of human-level intelligence, for which the 
potential outcomes are amplified when considering the 
presumed likelihood that this means that the AI could 
be readily replicated and distributed, doing so in a 
manner and form that heretofore of human intelligence 
could not be equally realized. 
 
Kurzweil’s book is provocatively titled as indicating 
that the singularity is near [39]. Others such as Walsh 
[61] offer a less optimistic timeline, indicating that the 
singularity is not only not near, it might not ever be 
near. Braga [9] suggests that despite whatever timing 
might be involved, the possibility of the singularity is 
surrounded by fallacies and that the debates about the 
singularity ought to be leveraged for considering how 
the dispute themselves gives rise to potential new 
opportunities in AI.  
 
For speculations about the timing of the singularity, 
there are said to be potential “defeaters” that could 
undermine the postulated timelines. For example, 
many in the AI field are apt to offer that extraordinary 
and undefined AI breakthroughs have to occur if the 
singularity is going to be attained and that the 
timelines oft-stated are based on as-yet discovered 
technological innovations [58] [59]. Assumptions are 
made that technological progress on AI is going to 
proceed in some determinable fashion, and as long as 
that estimated path continues, the timing for the 
singularity remains on-target. Chalmers [14] offers this 
pronouncement about the role and nature of defeaters 
in this manner: “As for defeaters: I will stipulate that 
these are anything that prevents intelligent systems 
(human or artificial) from manifesting their capacities 
to create intelligent systems. Potential defeaters 
include disasters, disinclination, and active prevention. 
For example, a nuclear war might set back our 
technological capacity enormously, or we (or our 
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successors) might decide that a singularity would be a 
bad thing and prevent research that could bring it 
about. I do not think considerations internal to 
artificial intelligence can exclude these possibilities, 
although we might argue on other grounds about how 
likely they are.” 
 
Another salient point frequently discussed about The 
Singularity involves the so-called Singularity Paradox. 
This is a presumed paradox that seems to undercut the 
doomsday scenarios that have been prophesied about 
the singularity. For example, one of the most famous 
doomsday indications involves the Paperclip Problem 
as described by Bostrom [8]. In this invented scenario, 
AI that has achieved singularity is asked by humanity 
to undertake the production of paperclips. The AI 
proceeds to do so, and takes this goal to an extreme, 
ultimately consuming all of the earth’s production 
capacity to make paperclips. In the exceptionally 
sorrowful versions of the Paperclip Problem, the AI 
determines that humans are preventing the AI from 
maximizing the making of paperclips and thus does 
away with humans entirely. Though this might seem 
like a reasoned concern, Ympolskiy [65] explains why 
the Singularity Paradox is a worthwhile consideration 
to refute some of these doomsday manifestations: 
“Investigators concerned with the existential risks 
posed to humankind by the appearance of 
superintelligence often describe what we shall call a 
Singularity Paradox (SP) as their main reason for 
thinking that humanity might be in danger. Briefly, SP 
could be described as: ‘Superintelligent machines are 
feared to be too dumb to possess commonsense.’”  
 
In other words, why would it be that an AI that we 
have deemed as achieving super-intelligence be so 
dimwitted that it would fall into these simpleton 
mental traps? As such, the doomsday scenarios ought 
to be eyed with a grain of salt, since they at times 
make assumptions in favor of what a super-
intelligence might do, while simultaneously treating 
the super-intelligence as sub-par intelligence in what it 
might do. 
 
In this section, The Singularity has been briefly 
expounded to showcase that it is a concept that has 
been in existence for a considerable while (at least 
seventy years or so), it is a topic of fluidity and 
multiple definitions, and that it posits quite serious and 
significant aspects about the future of AI and the 
future of humanity. We do not know that it will 
happen, and we do not know that it will not happen, 
and yet it is certainly worthwhile contemplating as it 
bodes for substantive impacts on society if it does 
indeed occur. Though some technologists are at times 
focused solely on the challenges and enthralling feat of 
developing AI to the point of The Singularity, there is 
a great deal of handwringing and concern among those 
of the AI community about the matter. This is 
noteworthy since there is often criticism of 
technologists that they fail to consider the 
Frankenstein-like potential outcomes of their work 
[36] [39], which does assuredly happen, yet the special 
case of The Singularity seems to have brought forth an 
awareness that pushing AI to such an extent requires 
consideration on what the results might portend.  
 
2 Legal Singularity 
 
In this section, the conceptual underpinnings of a 
potential Legal Singularity are explored. This is 
undertaken by first examining what the Legal 
Singularity might consist of, and then identifying how 
the Legal Singularity leverages The Singularity and 
also what is either omitted or being added beyond the 
conventional scope of The Singularity. 
 
2.1 Defining Legal Singularity 
 
The research by Alarie [1] provides a cornerstone 
indication of what a Legal Singularity might 
constitute. In brief, he asserts that the expansion of 
today’s Machine Learning capabilities entailing 
predictive and pattern matching facilities will grow 
stronger and be fed by masses of data about the law, 
doing so in an increasingly recursive fueled manner 
[1]: “The first is that technological progress continues 
to generate more data. The second is that our methods 
for analyzing data continue to improve due to 
increases in computing power and better methods of 
machine learning.” 
 
This would seem to be a phenomenon that would 
gradually and inexorably evolve and emerge, rather 
than any kind of overnight or instantaneous type of 
intelligence explosion. Furthermore, there is nothing 
overtly indicative that the resulting AI would be of a 
super-intelligence capacity. It would seem to be 
computationally impressive and extensive, though not 
somehow extending beyond the scope of everyday 
human intelligence as we understand such intelligence 
to be. Indeed, Alarie makes explicit that The 
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Singularity is a provocateur that led to the conceiving 
of a Legal Singularity, yet does not necessarily 
embrace the various keystones thereof: “The legal 
singularity is inspired by and different from the idea of 
the technological singularity popularized by the 
futurist Ray Kurzweil. The technological singularity 
refers to the stage when machines themselves become 
capable of building ever more capable and powerful 
machines, to the point of an intelligence explosion that 
exceeds human understanding or capacity to control 
(technological singularity is akin, then, to 
superintelligence).” 
 
Ultimately, according to Alarie [1], the Legal 
Singularity will be achieved or arrived at and impacts 
to the law and the practice of law will be 
overwhelmingly demonstrative, once legal certainty is 
attained: “The legal singularity will arrive when the 
accumulation of massively more data and dramatically 
improved methods of inference make legal uncertainty 
obsolete. The legal singularity contemplates complete 
law.” 
 
This is a crucial demarcation about the nature of an 
envisioned Legal Singularity. There is a presumed and 
explicitly stated arrival point at which the Legal 
Singularity can apparently be said to have been 
attained, namely once legal certainty is achieved, or on 
the other side of the coin, once all legal uncertainty is 
eliminated. An interesting and quite worth noting 
aspect of this as a measuring stick is that it perhaps can 
be utilized to escape the boundaries of necessarily 
assuming that Machine Learning and the accumulation 
of data are the required source for the Legal 
Singularity to be reached. In other words, if the Legal 
Singularity is principally defined as the attainment of 
pure legal certainty, we might then set aside how we 
got there, and be willing to consider other means by 
which that target of legal certainty could be attained. 
There is no need to cling per se to or be anchored to 
the assumption that it might be due to Machine 
Learning and the accumulation of data, and there 
might other explanations that give rise to the Legal 
Singularity (though the explanation of utilizing 
Machine Learning and the vast collection of data 
seems most convincing, today, given what we know 
about AI as of today). 
 
In an overall sense, the Legal Singularity is defined as 
an outcome. The outcome is the state at which the law 
is entirely certain and there is no uncertainty 
remaining.  
 
Various phrases have arisen to depict this potentiality, 
including: 
• Complete law 
• Seamless legal order 
• Self-executing legal system 
• Completely specified legal system 
• Functionally complete law 
• Etc. 
 
Another corresponding set of elements underlying this 
conception of the Legal Singularity is that it will of 
necessity allow universal access and real-time access 
to the law, which Alarie explains as: “The legal 
singularity contemplates the elimination of legal 
uncertainty and the emergence of a seamless legal 
order, universally accessible in real-time. In the legal 
singularity, disputes over the legal significance of 
agreed facts will be rare. They may be disputes over 
facts, but the once found, the facts will map on to clear 
legal consequences. The law will be functionally 
complete.” 
 
And the Legal Singularity will be in existence within 
specific domains of the law, along with inevitably 
occurring in all areas of the law. Alarie uses tax law as 
an exemplar of a particular domain of law, from which 
we can generalize across all subdomains of law [1]: “I 
predict that coming decades will witness three gradual 
transitions as the legal singularity draws nearer: (1) 
improved dispute resolution and access to justice in 
tax law, primarily through the transition from our 
current reliance on standards (adjudicated ex post) to 
greater reliance on query-able systems of complex 
rules (knowable ex ante); (2) a transition to superior 
and increasingly more complete specifications of tax 
law (i.e., a gradual transition from the complex, 
unwieldy, uncoordinated tax systems of today to tax 
systems that are massively complex and yet precisely 
and effectively distribute benefits and burdens); and, 
(3) with the realization of the legal singularity, a 
complete specification of tax law (and, indeed, all the 
other areas of law), which will thenceforth remain 
(more or less) in positive and normative equilibrium.” 
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Two additional key facets seem to be given notable 
consideration. One is that the Legal Singularity will be 
beneficial to justice and provide a presumably better 
consequence for society concerning the law [1]:  
“Ultimately, I believe these developments will result 
in the “legal singularity” which results in a more or 
less positively and normatively stable legal system.”  
 
Meanwhile, a noted downside to the Legal Singularity 
will be that it would render the law as less scrutable, 
perhaps even inscrutable, and thus have 
correspondingly negative consequences [1]: “The 
apotheosis of the legal system will be extraordinarily 
complex and will be beyond the complete 
understanding of any person.” This latter point of a 
lack of explainability or inability to undertake 
interpretation is sometimes referred to as a form of 
computational irreducibility, of which the law would 
be considered a type of black box in the instantiation 
of the Legal Singularity. 
 
As a quick recap of the major elements of a postulated 
Legal Singularity: 
• Outcome-based  
• Posited on achieving absolute legal certainty 
• Will occur gradually, subdomains at a time 
• Will ultimately occur across all of law 
• Leads to a more stable legal approach 
• Law becomes “black box” inscrutable 
• Arrival likely occurs via advances in AI and data 
• Does not seem to require an intelligence explosion 
• Does not seem to require super-intelligence 
• Loosely inspired by The Singularity 
 
Other researchers have sought to identify both 
strengths and weaknesses in the case being made for a 
Legal Singularity. Some view with significant doubt 
that a Legal Singularity would necessarily produce the 
anticipated benefits and might instead have substantive 
adverse consequences. Weber [63] for example 
postulates that there might be (at least) a twofold threat 
emerging from a Legal Singularity: (1) it would 
institutionalize existent biases of the legal system, (2) 
it would treat human rights as though people are 
merely atomized data points. Both of those adverse 
consequences could turn the populace away from 
embracing a Legal Singularity amid severe qualms 
about the overturning of the existent normative.  
 
These points are worthwhile to further explore. Per 
Weber [63], he suggests that we envision an AI system 
in the future, called Singulatim, and for which it 
embodies the Legal Singularity. Consider what might 
happen with Singulatim. There is already today an 
increasing awareness that contemporary Machine 
Learning algorithms tend to carryover biases that are 
inherently in the data used to train the AI systems. If a 
dataset has been collected that was based on prior 
decisions containing racist biases, and the Machine 
Learning patterns to that data, the result is likely to be 
an AI system that then incorporates and utilizes those 
biases. There is no common-sense or reasoning by the 
AI about what the data contains. Furthermore, the AI 
might have mathematically patterned to the data in an 
obscure and complex manner, making it nearly 
impossible to ferret out whether biases are now within 
the AI system. As stated by Weber: “The first [threat] 
is essentially critical: that the Singulatim software, in 
learning from how the legal system works, would 
institutionalize algorithmically the existing inequalities 
in the way the legal system treats its subjects.” 
 
In the matter of the second major threat of a Legal 
Singularity, Weber [63] emphasizes that since the AI 
does not have any cognition or human intelligence per 
se, and it is merely a Machine Learning algorithm that 
computationally is doing pattern matching, the result is 
that humans being subject to the laws are being 
reduced from being considered as sentient beings and 
instead be treated as data points in a computational 
machine [63]  “The second threat, on the other hand, 
strikes even deeper at the rule of law. The problem 
here is not that the Singulatim software cements in 
place some extra-legal hierarchy; instead, the issue is 
that the basic terms of universal rights might cease to 
make sense in the face of an epistemological shift that 
allows the law to only see atomized data points where 
it used to see integral, individual legal subjects.” This 
raises primary and legal core questions that can be 
formulated by what Weber [63] describes as strong-
form theorists and weak-form theorists: “Simplifying 
only somewhat, strong-form theorists pose the 
question Does the legal system protect against 
arbitrary government power and thereby promote 
liberty?, while weak-form theorists ask Does the legal 
system promote and maintain social order?” 
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In essence, perhaps ironically, the Legal Singularity 
might usurp and gut or undermine the essence of our 
approach to law and justice: “In those circumstances, 
the formerly latent tension holding together the rule of 
law and the universality principle would explode, 
destroying any normative force the latter was thought 
to impart to the former. To adopt the terminology in 
which legal futurism is often celebrated, the tension, 
no longer suppressed, would then disrupt the very 
foundations of the rule of law.” 
 
These weaknesses underlying the Legal Singularity are 
subtly predicated on a key facet that otherwise might 
have seemed not quite so consequential in this 
discussion so far, namely that the Legal Singularity is 
portrayed as being shaped by the Machine Learning 
that we conceive of today. If we reinvigorate the Legal 
Singularity by bringing from The Singularity that there 
might be a richer embodiment of human intelligence in 
AI, possibly even a super-intelligence, presumably the 
twofold threat is no longer quite as emboldened. 
Here’s why. Suppose that the Singulatim had the 
capacity of human intelligence and therefore might be 
able to detect and overcome the biases inherent in the 
underlying data of the law. Furthermore, the 
Singulatim in the case of the second threat would not 
necessarily be configuring the status of humans as data 
points per se, at least to the degree that if human 
intelligence was equivalence in the AI that there would 
be some representation beyond the simple data basis 
that computers today might be ascribed. In essence, 
the argument made about the Legal Singularity as 
being limited to ingratiating biases and treating people 
as mere numbers is predicated on the assumption that 
the Legal Singularity will be composed of Machine 
Learning as we make use of it today. By shifting 
toward a broader futuristic perspective, and an AI of a 
much greater capability, such an argument does not 
necessarily continue to hold (that’s not to mean that 
the AI would assuredly obviate biases and nor that it 
would not treat people as atomized data, only that it 
opens the door to the possibility that those key facets 
might not necessarily occur). 
 
As earlier mentioned, there is the Singularity Paradox, 
proffering the conundrum that some futurists at times 
are willing to ascribe to AI that it will be something of 
human intelligence or super-intelligence, and yet in the 
same context will portray or assume that the AI is to 
be dimwitted or fail to exhibit intelligence. In the 
conception of the Legal Singularity, by seemingly 
removing the capacity of reaching human intelligence 
(let alone super-intelligence), a Pandora’s box of 
concerns is readily opened widely. It might seem that 
an easy solution would be to reinsert into the Legal 
Singularity that AI of human intelligence levels will be 
required, in which case the “easy and obvious” 
problems inherent in the Legal Singularity could be 
explained as overcome by the intrinsic intelligence of 
the AI involved. This does not suggest that other 
problems will not ergo arise, only that the ones 
associated with any automation that is less than the 
level of human intelligence would typically contain.  
 
Skeptics though tend to deride the requirement of 
achieving human intelligence (or better) in such 
matters. First, whether AI can achieve human 
intelligence (or better) remains an unanswered 
question and might never be achieved. Thus, if the 
Legal Singularity did rely upon the assumption that 
human intelligence (or better) was a necessity for 
Legal Singularity, it would put the Legal Singularity 
into the same murky waters as The Singularity as to 
whether this will arise and if ever so. Second, some 
have a distaste for employing what they consider a 
magical fix, as it were, consisting of the assumption 
that human intelligence in AI will be achieved (this is 
seen as a “insert miracle here” kind of predicate). The 
viewpoint is that any kind of future can be devised by 
simply relying upon an amorphous and yet to be 
proven achievement of human intelligence into a 
machine. 
 
As an example of this kind of conundrum, it is 
relatively straightforward to pick apart the Legal 
Singularity in terms of its potential impacts by aiming 
at the already known limitations and shortcomings of 
today’s automation including Machine Learning. In 
the research by Deakin and Markou [18] they point out 
that law is a social institution and the Legal Singularity 
would operate in a social vacuum since it is 
computationally based (as we know of it today): “But 
if mathematical logic cannot capture the ‘situation-
specific understanding’ of legal reasoning and the 
complexity of the social world it exists in—at least to 
any extent congruent with how natural language 
categories cognize social referents and character of 
meaning—the hypothetical totalization of ‘AI judges’ 
implied by the legal singularity would instantiate a 
particular view of law: one in which legal judgments 
are essentially deterministic or probabilistic outputs, 
produced on the basis of static or unambiguous legal 
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rules, in a societal vacuum. This would deny, or see as 
irrelevant, competing conceptions of law, in particular 
the idea that law is a social institution, involving 
socially constructed activities, relationships, and 
norms not easily translated into numerical functions. It 
would also turn a blind eye to the reality that legal 
decision making involves an exercise of power which 
is both material and, in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense, 
‘symbolic ‘.” 
 
Overall, the Legal Singularity as conceptualized 
without some apparent semblance of human 
intelligence (or better) in the underlying AI is 
endlessly vulnerable to any number of shotgun or 
scattergun attacks as to being unable to rise above the 
limitations already known (and some likely yet to be 
surfaced) about contemporary versions of AI. This is 
not an attempt to have Legal Singularity switchover to 
embracing a more powerful semblance or sense of AI, 
and only pointing out the quagmire associated with a 
definition of Legal Singularity that resides dependent 
upon and impotent due to the assumption of today’s AI 
mechanizations. To be fair, the original concept does 
provide a type of escape clause by emphasizing that 
the Machine Learning would be based on better 
methods than used today, which is a crucial point that 
seems to be at times lost or lessened in criticisms of 
the conception of Legal Singularity. In any case, as 
will be discussed in Section 4, one means to cope with 
this difficulty is to recast the Legal Singularity in 
terms of the autonomous levels of AI Legal 
Reasoning, providing a path toward conceiving of the 
Legal Singularity across a spectrum of what AI might 
become. 
 
 
3 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [25].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
 
 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
3.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
3.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
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By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
3.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
3.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
3.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [17] [18] [20].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
3.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
3.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
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might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
4 Legal Singularity Multidimensionality, Alignment 
with LoA AILR 
 
This section combines the prior sections respective 
discussions about or pertaining to the Legal 
Singularity, doing so in two key ways: (a) Showcase 
how the Legal Singularity aligns with the autonomous 
levels of AI Legal Reasoning, and (b) Indicate the 
multidimensionality of the Legal Singularity by 
conducting a parametric analysis. This then provides 
the core contributions of this paper, and Section 5 then 
offers concluding remarks and recommendations for 
further research on these matters. 
 
4.1 Legal Singularity and the LoA AILR 
 
Existing indications about the Legal Singularity seem 
to imply that the Legal Singularity will potentially 
arise at a particular point in time. Another viewpoint 
would be to consider that the Legal Singularity will 
arise in a series of stages or phases.  
 
As shown in Figure B-1, the autonomous levels for AI 
Legal Reasoning are presented, and included in the 
lower region of the chart is a projected depiction of the 
Legal Singularity. This overlay provides a convenient 
means of portraying the possibility that the Legal 
Singularity will gradually emerge and evolve over 
time. 
 
At the levels less than 3, there is no expectation of the 
Legal Singularity and thus it is a grayed-out indication. 
Even though an argument could be made that during 
Level 1 and Level 2 there is some amount of 
groundwork being laid for the seeding and later 
growth of the Legal Singularity, this seems to be a pre-
seeding effort and not especially noteworthy for 
highlighting for the overall anticipated inception of the 
Legal Singularity. 
 
During Level 3, the Legal Singularity begins to take 
some palpable shape, doing so during the advanced AI 
efforts that consist primarily of prototypes and 
research-based activities of applying AI to the law. 
This tryout status will aid in ascertaining the viability 
of a Legal Singularity and likely to reveal the 
feasibility of a Legal Singularity occurring all told. 
 
Assuming that the Legal Singularity is viable, there is 
a denoted Stage A that might occur during Level 4, 
and a Stage B that might occur during Level 5, and a 
Stage C that might occur during Level 6. This 
indication should not be interpreted as a signal or 
prophecy that the Legal Singularity will indeed 
happen, since that is not the purpose or intent of this 
chart, and instead the viewpoint is that if the Legal 
Singularity were to arise that it might do so in the 
staged manner presented in the chart. 
 
At Level 4, the Legal Singularity would be taking hold 
at various subdomains of the law, such as a Legal 
Singularity in real estate law, family law, and so on.  
 
At Level 5, the Legal Singularity would be across all 
subdomains of law and therefore encompass all of the 
law.  
 
At Level 6, the Legal Singularity would be akin to 
Level 5 in that it would encompass all of the law and 
have an added aspect that the AI would be superhuman 
or consist of super-intelligence. As already noted 
earlier in this paper, it is unknown as to what the 
superhuman or super-intelligence might consist of, and 
thus highly speculative to assert what this might 
achieve in the case of Legal Singularity. In any case, 
since some believe a superhuman capacity might 
someday exist in AI, the Level 6 accounts for that 
possibility and similarly, the Legal Singularity 
accounts for the possibility too via an indicated Stage 
C. 
 
Overall, the Legal Singularity is aligned with the 
levels of autonomy (LoA) of the AI Legal Reasoning 
(AILR) in this manner: 
• Level 0: <not noteworthy> 
• Level 1: <not noteworthy> (pre-seed) 
• Level 2: <not noteworthy> (pre-seed) 
• Level 3: Tryout (pre-stage) 
• Level 4: Stage A 
• Level 5: Stage B 
• Level 6: Stage C 
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4.2 Multidimensionality of Legal Singularity 
 
Law research and the scholarly literature about the 
Legal Singularity have tended to silently encompass 
various dimensions underlying the Legal Singularity, 
meaning that those research efforts have not usually 
explicitly stated the dimensions being considered. It is 
contended here that those dimensions are in fact 
overtly identifiable and distinct, and of necessity 
should be explicitly stated. In essence, the dimensions 
have often been treated implicitly, serving as hidden 
assumptions, and not directly and purposely addressed 
per se. 
 
This lack of overtly naming the dimensions can 
confound discussions about the Legal Singularity. For 
example, research examining the Legal Singularity 
might fail to name a dimension and make essential 
unstated assumptions about its nature impacting the 
Legal Singularity. This omission or hidden assumption 
renders the research less informative and can 
undermine progress on explicating the Legal 
Singularity more fully. Furthermore, trying to compare 
one research effort on Legal Singularity to another can 
become onerous and unnecessarily argumentative due 
to a lack of stated dimensions, including the 
underlying assumptions the research authors are each 
respectively making regarding each such dimension. 
 
In reviewing the prior research on Legal Singularity, a 
dozen key dimensions have been identified. These are 
not all of the dimensions that might be conceived of, 
and merely a considered core set, though nonetheless 
provides a helpful starter and foundational means to 
further explore the multidimensionality. 
 
Figure B-2 indicates the dozen identified dimensions. 
Those identified dimensions consist of: 
• Alignment of Legal Singularity 
• Pace of Legal Singularity 
• Capability of Legal Singularity 
• Cornerstone of Legal Singularity 
• Scope of Legal Singularity 
• Legal Profession and Legal Singularity 
• Social Outcome of Legal Singularity 
• Justice and Legal Singularity 
• Paradoxes of Legal Singularity 
• Defeaters of Legal Singularity 
• Explainability of Legal Singularity 
• Control of Legal Singularity 
 
Each of these dimensions will be discussed in the next 
subsections. 
 
Note that the dimensions are not numbered, which is 
done purposely, since there is some apprehension that 
if they were shown in a numbered list it might imply a 
sense of priority or ranking among the dimensions. It 
is intended that the dimensions are to be considered 
without any overall ranking or priority and that they 
are all equal as elements or parameters of the Legal 
Singularity. That being said, there is certainly the 
usefulness of considering whether some dimensions 
are “more equal than others” and could be considered 
having greater weight in the emergence of the Legal 
Singularity or perhaps when assessing the potential 
impacts of the Legal Singularity. Thus, additional 
research could indeed opt to proffer weights or 
rankings to the dimensions, but doing so in this paper 
would seem to possibly undermine the crucial premise 
and distract from the overarching concept that there 
are dimensions and that those dimensions are worthy 
of attention (no need to distract from that premise by 
also simultaneously trying to tackle a ranking dispute 
too). 
 
Figure B-3 indicates the dimensions as shown in a 
range measurement chart. 
 
Each of the dimensions can be assigned a measuring 
element, doing so to further amplify and make visible 
the assumptions underlying the utilization of the 
dimension when discussing the Legal Singularity as a 
concept and potential phenomena. In this chart of 
Figure B-3, a range portrayal is used, indicating some 
semblance of varying assumptions about the 
dimension. Do not misinterpret the chart by assuming 
that the ranges are somehow all equal or comparable, 
which they are most decidedly not. The ranges are 
dimension specific. Furthermore, the ranges and the 
dimensions are not shown in any particular order that 
would imply prioritization or ranking (as earlier so 
pointed out).  
 
The intent of the Figure B-3 chart will become more 
evident when used as a means of comparing how 
different research on Legal Singularity has tended to 
characterize the Legal Singularity and can aid too in 
making explicit the implicit assumptions of those 
research efforts. This will be further discussed in the 
subsections of this section. Note too that there is 
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nothing magical or dogmatic about the range 
indicators, such that additional research is likely to 
indicate other means of specifying the ranges and their 
utility in being measured and compared. 
 
4.2.1 Alignment of Legal Singularity 
 
Alignment of Legal Singularity generally refers to its 
timing with respect to The Singularity.  
 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity will occur and 
perhaps can only occur upon or after The Singularity 
has happened, whilst others claim that the Legal 
Singularity can occur before The Singularity and 
indeed there is not any necessity that The Singularity 
needs to ever happen (concerning the occurrence of 
the Legal Singularity). 
 
 
4.2.2 Pace of Legal Singularity 
 
Pace of Legal Singularity generally refers to the speed 
at which the Legal Singularity will emerge or arise.  
 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity will playout 
gradually, step by step, over an elongated time, while 
others indicate that as per many beliefs about The 
Singularity that there will be a sparked moment or 
instantaneous emergence rather than a gradual one. 
 
 
4.2.3 Capability of Legal Singularity 
 
Capability of Legal Singularity generally refers to the 
magnitude of intelligence requisite for the onset of the 
Legal Singularity. 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity will be enabled 
by AI and Machine Learning that is either at the 
human level of intelligence or akin to human 
intelligence but perhaps less so in certain respects, 
while others believe that the Legal Singularity will 
require a superhuman or super-intelligence capacity by 
the AI. 
 
4.2.4 Cornerstone of Legal Singularity 
 
Cornerstone of Legal Singularity generally refers to 
the crucial component of certainty, considered a 
cornerstone upon which Legal Singularity is founded. 
 
Some assert that Legal Singularity will only be 
considered as emerged when legal certainty is 
achieved as an absolute, thus presumably eliminating 
all legal uncertainty, while others believe that some 
amount of legal uncertainty can remain and yet 
nonetheless still have the achievement of Legal 
Singularity. 
 
4.2.5 Scope of Legal Singularity 
 
Scope of Legal Singularity generally refers to the 
aspect of how much of the law will be encompassed 
by the Legal Singularity. 
 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity will entail all of 
the law, while others indicate it could be instead 
selected subdomains of the law, for which both 
viewpoints might be in agreement if it is said that this 
will evolve, though these views could be in 
disagreement if it is stated as a winner-take-all that the 
Legal Singularity only arises when all of the law has 
been included. 
 
4.2.6 Legal Profession and Legal Singularity 
 
Legal Profession and Legal Singularity generally 
refers to the notion that the Legal Singularity might 
dramatically impact the legal profession in terms of 
the need for and employment of human legal 
professionals. 
 
Some assert that a Legal Singularity might be seen as 
an augmentation to the legal profession, thus to some 
degree still employing and requiring the use of human 
legal professionals, whilst others suggest that the legal 
profession might be “wiped out” entirely and be 
replaced by AI as part of a Legal Singularity 
emergence. 
 
4.2.7 Social Outcome of Legal Singularity 
 
Social Outcome of Legal Singularity generally refers 
to the societal result of a Legal Singularity. 
 
Some assert that a Legal Singularity might cause the 
law to become a societally oppressive tool and 
produce a Dystopian future, whilst others believe that 
the Legal Singularity will provide a societally uplifting 
capacity that will lead to a Utopian style future.  
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4.2.8 Justice and Legal Singularity 
 
Justice and Legal Singularity generally refers to the 
impacts that the Legal Singularity would have on the 
principles of justice, equity, and fairness. 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity might lessen 
justice, reduce equity, and usurp fairness, while others 
argue that it could instead boost justice, increase 
equity, and provide greater assurance of fairness. 
 
 
 
4.2.9 Paradoxes of Legal Singularity 
 
Paradoxes of Legal Singularity generally refer to the 
same notion as Singularity Paradoxes of The 
Singularity (as explicated in the prior sections) but as 
applicable to the Legal Singularity. 
 
Some assert that if the Legal Singularity can eliminate 
legal uncertainty that it ergo is implausible to attack 
Legal Singularity for other potential failings since it 
would presumably be as strong in those other respects, 
while others argue that there are potential weak spots 
nonetheless and other problematic aspects that are 
detectable and decidedly not paradoxical. 
 
 
 
4.2.10 Defeaters of Legal Singularity 
 
Defeaters of Legal Singularity generally refer to the 
same notion as Defeaters with respect to The 
Singularity (as explicated in prior sections) but as 
applicable to the Legal Singularity. 
 
An overarching question often posed about The 
Singularity it is inevitable or whether mankind will 
explicitly ascertain whether it will happen; likewise, 
the Legal Singularity can be said to subject to the same 
conditions, namely that there might be a plethora of 
aspects that could either delay the Legal Singularity or 
render it never to arise, and for which might be led by 
those within the law industry or those outside of the 
legal profession. 
 
 
4.2.11 Explainability of Legal Singularity 
 
Explainability of Legal Singularity generally refers to 
the aspect of whether the law and the legal 
mechanizations thereof will be explainable in the 
emergence of the Legal Singularity. 
 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity will end-up 
rendering the law as inscrutable, whilst others contend 
that the law might become more visible, more 
explainable, and better understood as a result of the 
Legal Singularity. 
 
 
 
4.2.12 Control of Legal Singularity 
 
Control of Legal Singularity generally refers to the 
amount of control of the Legal Singularity by mankind 
versus automation. 
 
Some assert that the Legal Singularity could produce 
an automation-based form of legal justice that 
becomes detached from humanity and might end-up 
with essentially AI being in control, whilst others 
argue that the touch of mankind would remain firmly 
on the wheels of justice and be overseeing and able to 
fully control the legal automation or autonomy. 
 
 
 
4.3 Examples of the Legal Singularity Dimensions 
Chart 
 
To illuminate the utility of having the Legal 
Singularity dimensions explicitly arrayed, consider 
how the dimensionality chart can be productively 
utilized. 
 
Figure B-4 shows an example of the Legal Singularity 
dimensional chart as marked for a scenario labeled 
simply as Example 1A. 
 
Envision that a researcher has examined the Legal 
Singularity and offered various nuances and arguments 
in favor of or opposition to other prior research.   
 
Likely, there are numerous base assumptions that the 
researcher has made about the Legal Singularity. 
 
By using the Legal Singularity dimensional chart, we 
can make explicit the assumptions being made. As 
shown in Figure B-4, the research is essentially 
postulating that: 
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• Alignment of Legal Singularity: Before AI 
Singularity 
• Pace of Legal Singularity: Gradual 
• Capability of Legal Singularity: Human 
Intelligence (minimal needed) 
• Cornerstone of Legal Singularity: Absolute 
Legal Certainty 
• Scope of Legal Singularity: Subdomains 
(leading toward all) 
• Legal Profession and Legal Singularity: 
Augmentation 
• Social Outcome of Legal Singularity: 
Dystopian and Utopian (mixed) 
• Justice and Legal Singularity: More Equity & 
Fairness (tends toward) 
• Paradoxes of Legal Singularity: Some 
• Defeaters of Legal Singularity: Within Law 
• Explainability of Legal Singularity: 
Inscrutable 
• Control of Legal Singularity: By Mankind 
 
Some notable facets to keep in mind are that the 
ranges are not intended to be numerical, which some 
might desire, such as numbering each of the markers 
between the ranges. It is not intended that the chart 
would be used in such a fashion, and once again if 
done as such might distract from its overall utility. 
Likewise, it is essentially inappropriate to try and state 
that a range endpoint is a descriptor when the diamond 
marker is somewhere along the given spectrum. In that 
sense, even the above indicates that the pace of legal 
singularity is “Gradual” provides a somewhat 
misleading and flat indication of what the actual 
marking consisted of, which was primarily toward 
gradual but with some semblance of leaning slightly 
toward the instantaneous. 
 
Figure B-5 is another example, labeled as Example 
1B. 
 
This example showcases a circumstance whereby the 
research being analyzed for its base assumption across 
each of the dimensions has tended toward the extremes 
of the ranges. If there was interest in comparing the 
research depicted by Example 1A with Example 1B, it 
would be relatively straightforward to then compare 
the two as based on the assumptions they each 
respectively are making about how the Legal 
Singularity is to be considered. 
 
5.0 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
There is a myriad of additional considerations that 
arise from this discussion about Legal Singularity and 
further research is amply warranted.  
 
As an example of open topics, consider the aspect that 
Legal Singularity appears to be predicated principally 
on the singular dimension or parameter entailing legal 
certainty (or if so preferred, legal uncertainty). This 
focus on an individual dimension as the particular 
underpinning can be viewed as problematic for a 
variety of demonstrative reasons, as I will outline next. 
 
Concerns about the certainty dimension include these 
facets: 
 
• Oversized Requirement for Purity of 
Certainty. A purity assumption of attaining 
absolute legal certainty as a precondition for 
Legal Singularity is potentially an 
insurmountable hurdle since it presumably 
precludes any amount of legal uncertainty, 
even the most infinitesimal trace, and this 
seems a prohibitive directive that does not 
allow for the likely wavering or fluctuation of 
and between states of legal certainty and legal 
uncertainty. As such, apparently, as long as 
there is any semblance of legal uncertainty, 
Legal Singularity cannot be deemed as having 
been reached and nor maintained, and the 
question arises whether the complete 
expungement of legal uncertainty shall be 
feasible. 
 
• Assumption of Exclusively Deterministic 
Algorithms. The manner of Machine 
Learning and AI that will produce the legal 
certainty seems to be based on a form of 
deterministic algorithms, exclusively, as 
though there is no inclusion of non-
deterministic algorithms. There does not seem 
to be any corroborated basis in the defining of 
Legal Singularity to support such a claim or 
assertion of this presumed deterministic 
nature. As such, given that non-determinism is 
a seemingly strong potential in the case of AI 
and the law, and perhaps even a necessary 
ingredient, this realization then introduces 
probabilistic behavior, which in turn 
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substantively undermines the tenet of 
requiring complete and steadfast legal 
certainty.  
 
• Progression Toward Legal Uncertainty 
Rather Than Legal Certainty. Research by 
D’Amato [68] asserts that legal certainty is 
decreasing over time, thus legal uncertainty is 
rising, and that there is a fallacy among many 
legal scholars that falsely propagate a myth of 
legal certainty increasing over time. He 
suggests that the rules and principles of law 
tend to splinter and be generative over time 
and thus engenders legal uncertainty [68]: 
“Legal certainty decreases over time. Rules 
and principles of law become more and more 
uncertain in content and in application because 
legal systems are biased in favor of unraveling 
those rules and principles.” In his view, legal 
rules suffer from several maladies [68]: 
“When I argue that rules unravel over time, I 
mean that, using any of these extended 
definitions of the term, a ‘rule’ becomes 
increasingly vague, inapplicable, remote, 
ambiguous, or exception ridden.” The Legal 
Singularity appears to presuppose that due to 
the (future) AI capacity of predictiveness, the 
law will become increasingly certain, but this 
raises at least two considerations. First, this 
might be a proverbial cart before the horse in 
that the AI is assumed as somehow leading to 
certainty and yet the law itself might be 
inexorably moving intrinsically toward 
uncertainty. Second, if one assumes that the 
advent of AI is going to reverse the tendency 
of the law going toward uncertainty, this needs 
some robust rationalizing as to why this would 
of necessity be the case (i.e., it might provide 
some impetus, but the argument seems to be 
made is that it will magnetically do so to the 
degree of achieving ultimate and complete 
legal certainty). 
 
• Doctrinaire Belief That Legal Certainty Is 
The Pinnacle. On the surface, there is a 
comforting sense that eliminating all legal 
uncertainty is a highly desirable outcome and 
that achieving purity of legal certainty is a 
proper and crucial goal. But there seems to be 
more to the tradeoffs between legal certainty 
and the allowance for some amount of legal 
uncertainty than otherwise ordinarily meets 
the eye. As per D’Amato [68], he indicates 
that though legal certainty is generally and 
primarily the desirable goal, there is 
nonetheless still a basis for some value from 
legal uncertainty: “One may ask, however, 
whether uncertainty in the law is undesirable. 
Although I contend that it is, in some cases it 
might not be.” Thus, if the Legal Singularity is 
the apex, and for which legal certainty 
underlies it, there would seem to be a need to 
substantiate how the solidity of legal certainty 
will overcome those instances for which legal 
uncertainty is viewed as a positive rather than 
a negative element. 
 
• Legal Certainty Is Only One Leg Of The 
Law Triad: Focusing solely on legal certainty 
as the bedrock dimension for Legal 
Singularity would appear to defy the assertion 
that legal certainty is part of a triad of the law 
(which will be elucidated momentarily 
herein), and thus encompasses only one of 
three key principles of the law that need to be 
observed. By many legal scholars, it is 
generally suggested that the legal triad is akin 
to a three-legged stool, whereby each leg 
exists to keep the others in balance, and a stool 
with but one leg would be unbalanced. 
Consider this indication of Radbruch’s legal 
precepts as depicted by Leawood [69]: “To 
complete the concept of law Radbruch uses 
three general precepts: purposiveness, justice, 
and legal certainty. Therefore, Radbruch 
defines law as ‘the complex of general 
precepts for the living-together of human 
beings’ whose ultimate idea is oriented toward 
justice or equality.” In the legal certainty leg 
of the law, Leawood depicts Radbruch’s views 
in this manner: “Radbruch’s final precept is 
legal certainty. An important part of legal 
certainty is the justice it provides through, if 
nothing else, its predictability.” This then 
indubitably supports the importance of legal 
certainty and bolsters its basis for being at the 
core of Legal Singularity, but Leawood points 
out that legal certainty is not an island unto 
itself: “Certainly, the conflict between legal 
certainty and justice or between legal certainty 
and purposiveness is easy to imagine. For 
example, legal certainty would demand that a 
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law be upheld even though the result would be 
an unjust application of the law. Therefore, in 
most cases the content, form, and validity of 
the law are understood in terms of Radbruch’s 
triad; three equally weighted principles that, 
while in tension and possibly in contradiction, 
are found together.” In short, how does the 
envisioned Legal Singularity motivate the 
triad if the seemingly sole measure is to be 
based on legal certainty, and as such might 
lead to serious deficiencies in the other two, 
namely purposiveness and justice, by 
overemphasizing and potentially undercutting 
the tension and dynamics of the triad? 
 
• Legal Certainty Reliance Upon Legal Rules 
Versus Legal Principles. The Legal 
Singularity would appear to suggest that the 
advent of AI and Machine Learning will 
enable encapsulation of legal rules, and in 
turn, this will lead to the attainment of legal 
certainty. Essentially, the assumption would 
appear to be that legal rules will ultimately 
and unerringly produce legal certainty. Some 
legal scholars have argued that there are 
circumstances whereby legal rules can lead to 
legal certainty, and yet there is also 
circumstance for which legal principles lead to 
legal certainty and legal rules do not. Per 
Braithwaite [67]: “This has been an attempt to 
develop a theory of legal certainty and to show 
that questions like whether presumptive 
positivism is a legal theory that should attract 
our allegiance depends on testing its empirical 
claims and assumptions about how rules work. 
The theory we have come to has three 
propositions: (1) When the type of action to be 
regulated is simple, stable and does not 
involve huge economic interests, rules tend to 
regulate with greater certainty than principles. 
(2) When the type of action to be regulated is 
complex, changing and involves large 
economic interests: (a) principles tend to 
regulate with greater certainty than rules; (b) 
binding principles backing non-binding rules 
tend to regulate with greater certainty than 
principles alone; (c) binding principles 
backing non-binding rules are more certain 
still if they are embedded in institutions of 
regulatory conversation that foster shared 
sensibilities.” If the Legal Singularity is 
foundationally assuming that only legal rules 
will lead to the desired legal certainty, this 
would seem to overlook or omit the role of 
legal principles, but if legal principles are also 
to be included it raises the corresponding 
question of how legal certainty is to be 
attained and legal uncertainty to be eradicated. 
 
These probing questions about the legal certainty 
dimension are vital to the crux of the Legal Singularity 
concept. From such questions, it is potentially the case 
that further refinement and adjustment of the Legal 
Singularity might be spurred. Additional dimensions 
might be considered for inclusion or at least for 
explicit acknowledgment and placement. Asking these 
kinds of questions is not to be interpreted as a 
disparaging of the Legal Singularity and instead 
should be viewed as aiding the future exploration and 
maturation of the Legal Singularity concept. 
 
This paper has closely examined the postulated Legal 
Singularity and proffered that such AI and Law 
cogitations can be enriched by the three facets 
addressed herein: (1) by dovetailing additionally 
salient considerations of The Singularity into the Legal 
Singularity, (2) by making use of the in-depth and 
innovative multidimensional parametric analysis of the 
Legal Singularity as posited in this paper, and (3) by 
aligning and unifying the Legal Singularity with the 
Levels of Autonomy (LoA) associated with AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR) as propounded in this paper. 
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